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I examine the hypothesis that consciousness can be understood as a state of matter, “percep-
tronium”, with distinctive information processing abilities. I explore five basic principles that may
distinguish conscious matter from other physical systems such as solids, liquids and gases: the
information, integration, independence, dynamics and utility principles. This approach general-
izes Giulio Tononi’s integrated information framework for neural-network-based consciousness to
arbitrary quantum systems, and provides interesting links to error-correcting codes and condensed
matter criticality, as well as an interesting connections between the emergence of consciousness and
the emergence of time. (For more technical details, see http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 .)
Why are you conscious right now? Specifically, why
are you having a subjective experience of reading these
words, seeing colours and hearing sounds, while the inan-
imate objects around you presumably aren’t having any
subjective experience at all?
Different people mean different things by “conscious-
ness”, including awareness of environment or self. I am
asking the more basic question of why you experience
anything at all, which is the essence of what philosopher
David Chalmers has coined “the hard problem” of con-
sciousness.
A traditional answer to this problem is dualism — that
living entities differ from inanimate ones because they
contain some non-physical element such as an “anima”
or “soul”. Support for dualism among scientists has grad-
ually dwindled. To understand why, consider that your
body is made of about 1029 quarks and electrons, which
as far as we can tell move according to simple physical
laws. Imagine a future technology able to track all your
particles: if they were found to obey the laws of physics
exactly, then your purported soul is having no effect on
your particles, so your conscious mind and its ability to
control your movements would have nothing to do with
a soul.
If your particles were instead found not to obey the
known laws of physics because they were being pushed
around by your soul, then we could treat the soul as just
another physical entity able to exert forces on particles,
and study what physical laws it obeys.
Let us therefore explore the other option, known as
physicalism: that consciousness is a process that can oc-
cur in certain physical systems. This begs a fascinating
question: why are some physical entities conscious, while
others are not? If we consider the most general state
of matter that experiences consciousness — let’s call it
“perceptronium” — then what special properties does it
have that we could in principle measure in a lab? What
are these physical correlates of consciousness? Parts of
your brain clearly have these properties right now, as well
as while you were dreaming last night, but not while you
were in deep sleep.
Imagine all the food you have eaten in your life and
consider that you are simply some of that food, rear-
ranged. This shows that your consciousness isn’t simply
due to the atoms you ate, but depends on the complex
patterns into which these atoms are arranged. If you can
also imagine conscious entities, say aliens or future super-
intelligent robots, made out of different types of atoms
then this suggests that consciousness is an emergent phe-
nomenon (whose complex behaviour emerges from many
simple interactions). In a similar spirit, generations of
physicists and chemists have studied what happens when
you group together vast numbers of atoms, finding that
their collective behaviour depends on the patterns in
which they are arranged: the key difference between a
solid, a liquid and a gas lies not in the types of atoms,
but in their arrangement. Boiling or freezing a liquid
simply rearranges its atoms.
My hope is that we will ultimately be able to under-
stand perceptronium as yet another state of matter. Just
as there are many types of liquids, there are many types
of consciousness. However, this should not preclude us
from identifying, quantifying, modelling and understand-
ing the characteristic properties that all liquid forms of
matter, or all conscious forms of matter, share. Take
waves, for example, which are substrate-independent in
the sense that they can occur in all liquids, regardless
of the liquid’s atomic composition. Like consciousness,
waves are an emergent phenomenon in the sense that
they take on a life of their own: a wave can traverse a
lake while the individual water molecules merely bob up
and down, and the motion of the wave can be described
by a mathematical equation that doesn’t care what the
wave is made of.
Something analogous happens in computing: Alan
Turing famously proved that all sufficiently advanced
computers can simulate one another, so a video game
character in her virtual world would have no way of know-
ing whether her computational substrate (“computron-
ium”) was a Mac or a PC, or what types of atoms the
CPU was made of. All that would matter is abstract in-
formation processing. If this created character were com-
plex enough to be conscious, like in the film The Matrix,
then what properties would this information processing
need to have?
I have long contended that consciousness is the way in-
formation feels when processed in certain complex ways.
The neuroscientist Giulio Tononi has made this idea more
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for an information processing system to be conscious,
its information must be integrated into a unified whole.
In other words, it must be impossible to decompose
the system into nearly independent parts — otherwise
these parts would feel like two separate conscious enti-
ties. Tononi and his collaborators have incorporated this
idea into an elaborate mathematical formalism known as
integrated information theory (IIT).
IIT has generated significant interest in the neuro-
science community, because it offers answers to many
intriguing questions. For example, why do some infor-
mation processing systems in our brains appear to be
unconscious? Based on extensive research correlating
brain measurements with subjectively reported experi-
ence, neuroscientist Christof Koch and others have con-
cluded that the cerebellum — a brain area whose roles
include motor control — is not conscious, but is an un-
conscious information processor that helps other parts of
the brain with certain computational tasks.
The IIT explanation for this is that the cerebellum
is mainly a collection of “feed-forward” neural networks
in which information flows like water down a river, and
each neuron affects mostly those downstream. If there is
no feedback, there is no integration and hence no con-
sciousness. The same would apply to Google’s recent
feed-forward artificial neural network that processed mil-
lions of YouTube video frames to determine whether they
contained cats. In contrast, the brain systems linked to
consciousness are strongly integrated, with all parts able
to affect one another.
IIT thus offers an answer to the question of whether
a superintelligent computer would be conscious: it de-
pends. A part of its information processing system that
is highly integrated will indeed be conscious. However,
IIT research has shown that for many integrated systems,
one can design a functionally equivalent feed-forward sys-
tem that will be unconscious. This means that so-called
“p-zombies” can, in principle, exist: systems that behave
like a human and pass the Turing test for machine intel-
ligence, yet lack any conscious experience whatsoever.
Many current “deep learning” AI systems are of this p-
zombie type. Fortunately, integrated systems such as
those in our brains typically require much fewer computa-
tional resources than their feed-forward “zombie” equiv-
alents, which may explain why evolution has favoured
them and made us conscious.
Another question answered by IIT is why we are un-
conscious during seizures, sedation and deep sleep, but
not REM sleep. Although our neurons remain alive and
well during sedation and deep sleep, their interactions are
weakened in a way that reduces integration and hence
consciousness. During a seizure, the interactions instead
get so strong that vast numbers of neurons start imitat-
ing one another, losing their ability to contribute inde-
pendent information, which is another key requirement
for consciousness according to IIT. This is analogous to
a computer hard drive where the bits that encode infor-
mation are forced to be either all zeros or all ones, result-
ing in the drive storing only a single bit of information.
Tononi, together with Adenauer Casali, Marcello Mas-
simini and other collaborators, recently validated these
ideas with lab experiments. They defined a “conscious-
ness index” that they could measure by using an EEG
to monitor the brain’s electrical activity after magnetic
stimulation, and used it to successfully predict whether
patients were conscious.
Awake and dreaming patients had comparably high
consciousness indices, whereas those anaesthetised or in
deep sleep had much lower values. The index even suc-
cessfully identified as conscious two patients with locked-
in syndrome, who were aware and awake but prevented
by paralysis from speaking or moving . This illustrates
the promise of this technique for helping doctors deter-
mine whether unresponsive patients are conscious.
Despite these successes, IIT leaves many questions
unanswered. If it is to extend our consciousness-detection
ability to animals, computers and arbitrary physical sys-
tems, then we need to ground its principles in fundamen-
tal physics. IIT takes information, measured in bits, as
a starting point. But when I view a brain or computer
through my physicist’s eyes, as myriad moving particles,
then what physical properties of the system should be
interpreted as logical bits of information? I interpret as
a “bit” both the position of certain electrons in my com-
puter’s RAM memory (determining whether the micro-
capacitor is charged) and the position of certain sodium
ions in your brain (determining whether a neuron is fir-
ing), but on the basis of what principle? Surely there
should be some way of identifying consciousness from
the particle motions alone, even without this informa-
tion interpretation? If so, what aspects of the behaviour
of particles corresponds to conscious integrated informa-
tion?
The problem of identifying consciousness in an arbi-
trary collection of moving particles is similar to the sim-
pler problem of identifying objects there. For instance,
when you drink iced water, you perceive an ice cube in
your glass as a separate object because its parts are more
strongly connected to one another than to their environ-
ment. In other words, the ice cube is both fairly inte-
grated and fairly independent of the liquid in the glass.
The same can be said about the ice cube’s constituents,
from water molecules all the way down to atoms, protons,
neutrons, electrons and quarks. Zooming out, you simi-
larly perceive the macroscopic world as a dynamic hierar-
chy of objects that are strongly integrated and relatively
independent, all the way up to planets, solar systems and
galaxies.
This grouping of particles into objects reflects how
they are stuck together, which can be quantified by the
amount of energy needed to pull them apart. But we
can also reinterpret this in terms of information: if you
know the position of one of the atoms in the piston of an
engine, then this gives you information about the where-
abouts of all the other atoms in the piston, because they
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tween inanimate and conscious objects is that for the lat-
ter, too much integration is a bad thing: the piston atoms
act much like neurons during a seizure, slavishly tracking
one another so that very few bits of independent infor-
mation exist in this system. A conscious system must
thus strike a balance between too little integration (such
as a liquid with atoms moving fairly independently) and
too much integration (such as a solid), suggesting that
consciousness is maximised near a phase transition be-
tween less- and more-ordered states; indeed, humans lose
consciousness unless key physical parameters of our brain
are kept within a narrow range of values.
An elegant balance between information and integra-
tion can be achieved using error-correcting codes: meth-
ods for storing bits of information that know about each
other, so that all information can be recovered from a
fraction of the bits. These are widely used in telecom-
munications, as well as in the ubiquitous QR codes from
whose characteristic pattern of black and white squares
your smartphone can read a web address. As error correc-
tion has proven so useful in our technology, it would be in-
teresting to search for error-correcting codes in the brain,
in case evolution has independently discovered their util-
ity — and perhaps made us conscious as a side effect.
We know that our brains have some ability to correct
errors because you can recall the correct lyrics for a song
you know from a slightly incorrect fragment of it. John
Hopfield, a biophysicist renowned for his eponymous neu-
ral network model of the brain, proved that his model has
precisely this error-correcting property. However, if the
hundred billion neurons in our brain do form a Hopfield
network, calculations show that it could only support
about 37 bits of integrated information — the equivalent
of a few words of text. This begs the question of why the
information content of our conscious experience seems
to be significantly larger than 37 bits. The plot thickens
when we view our brain’s moving particles as a quantum-
mechanical system. As I showed in January, the maxi-
mum amount of integrated information then drops from
37 bits to about 0.25 bits, and making the system larger
doesn’t help (arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219).
This integration problem can be circumvented by
adding another principle to the list that a physical system
must obey in order to be conscious. So far I have outlined
three: the information principle (it must have substantial
information storage capacity), the independence princi-
ple (if must have substantial independence from the rest
of the world) and the integration principle (it cannot con-
sist of nearly independent parts). The aforementioned
0.25 bit problem can be bypassed if we also add the dy-
namics principle — that a conscious system must have
substantial information-processing capacity, and it is this
processing rather than the static information that must
be integrated. For example, two separate computers or
brains can’t form a single consciousness.
These principles are intended as necessary but not suf-
ficient conditions for consciousness, much like low com-
pressibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
being a liquid. As I explore in my book Our Mathe-
matical Universe, this leads to promising prospects for
grounding consciousness and IIT in fundamental physics,
although much work remains and the jury is still out on
whether it will succeed.
If it does succeed, this will be important not only for
neuroscience and psychology, but also for fundamental
physics, where many of our most glaring problems re-
flect our confusion about how to treat consciousness. In
Einstein’s theory of general relativity, we model the “ob-
server” as a fictitious disembodied massless entity having
no effect whatsoever on that which is observed. In con-
trast, the textbook interpretation of quantum mechanics
states that the observer does affect the observed. Yet af-
ter a century of spirited debate, there is still no consensus
on how exactly to think of the quantum observer. Some
recent papers have argued that the observer is the key to
understanding other fundamental physics mysteries, such
as why our universe appears so orderly, why time seems
to have a preferred forward direction, and even why time
appears to flow at all.
If we can figure out how to identify conscious observers
in any physical system and calculate how they will per-
ceive their world, then this might answer these vexing
questions.
